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The 'Ship': At the Mercy of English Law
Simon Daniels
Abstract
The current position taken by HM Revenue & Customs regarding
the definition of a 'ship' following the taxation appeal of Torr &
Others v HMRC has generated a storm in Parliament, as well as
in the shipping community.
This paper examines the broader implications of this
controversial issue in maritime law, focusing on the meaning of a
'ship', and the consistency of its application within the English
Legal System. Alarmingly, it exposes a failure of good
governance which Parliament shall ignore at its peril.
Introduction
On 21 st October 2008 David Anderson, Labour MP for the
Constituency of Blaydon, in the traditional maritime County of Tyne and
Wear, put a written Parliamentary Question to the Chancellor of the
Exchequer in two parts: I
(1) what estimate he has made of the averagefinancial effect on
seafarers if the seafarers' earnings deduction is removed;
(2) if he will review the decision ofHM Revenue and Customs to
remove the seafarers' earnings deduction.
Responding on behalf of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Stephen
Timms, the acting Chief Executive Officer of HM Revenue and Customs
(HMRC) stated:
HMRC is not removing seafarers' earnings deduction (SED).
Rather HMRC will revise its guidance on SED to reflect a
decision made by the Special Commissioners, an independent
appellate body, in the case of Torr and Others v. CIR
1 21 October 2008 Hansard Column 338W
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(SpC679) ... .I am aware of the concerns raised by the Special
Commissioners decision in this case, which centred on whether
the vessel on which the appellants performed their duties was a
ship or an 'offshore installation' within the meaning of the
legislation. The Special Commissioners decided it had been
operating as an offshore installation, and refused the appellants'
claims to SED.
Mr Timms may have been guessing that this presented an unsatisfactory
answer to the concerns of MPs and their constituents. If so, his guess
proved correct beyond his wildest dreams.
Two days later, Lindsay Hoyle, Labour MP for Chorley, put the
question to the Chancellor of the Exchequer:
What the reasons were for the decision by HM Revenue and
Customs to review the guidance on vessels that do not qualify
under the seafarers' earnings deduction income tax rules.
Joan Walley, Labour MP for Stoke-on-Trent North, followed with another
question to the Chancellor of the Exchequer in two parts:
(I) what recent representations he has received on seafarers'
earnings deduction; and if he will make a statement;
(2) whether he plans to meet the Secretary of State for Transport to
discuss the effects of the reclassification of seafarers' earnings
deduction on the recruitment and retention of British seafarers.
Poor Mr Timms was the respondent again; sadly, his response to
these questions, however, proved equally unsatisfactorily, adding little to
his previous reply. He did assure the House, though, that HMRC would
discuss implementation with interested stakeholders before the revised
guidance is issued but, in fairness, did little to assuage the fears of
thousands of UK seafarers serving on board ships, that the tax regime
would expose them to bills as much as £46,0003, merely by re-defining the
meaning of the word 'ship' and distinguishing it from an 'offshore
installation. In the meantime, Angus MacNeil and Katy Clark put down
early day motions, calling on the Government to intervene urgently in the
matter, in the interests of the UK's maritime sector.
223 October 200K Hansard Column 547W
3 Nautilus UK Telegrapb, October 200K, Nautilus UK, London
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[t is not entirely clear whether HMRC appreciates the downstream
consequences of the position which it has taken in terms of maritime law.
[n any event, it is essential to assess the validity of the current position of
HMRC regarding the definition of 'Ship', because of the obvious fact that
either a vessel is a ship or she is not. In terms of effective jurisprudence
and good governance, she cannot occasionally be a ship and at other times
an offshore installation; if she were, we would be confronted with absurd
questions to address, for example, such as, at what times would the
legislative provisions for ships and their certification apply?
If HMRC's interpretation does, indeed, become embraced in the
pantheon of Statute [aw, the question of what Parliament intends to convey
by the word 'Ship' may be inconsistent with current Statute and Common
Law. As a matter of fact, if not of law, the meaning of a 'Ship' in other
flag state jurisdictions may also be relevant, for ships protected by other
sovereign states have the singular habit of visiting UK territorial waters, so
the question then arises as to the inconsistencies between findings of fact
under UK Law and the Laws of other jurisdictions.
The Source of the Problem
The case of Torr and Others v HMRC4 involved an Appea[ heard by
Theodore Wallace, Special Commissioner, regarding the denial of a tax
concession, known as foreign earnings deduction, which had hitherto been
enjoyed by the appellant seafarers.
The appellants served on the Pride South America, a self-propelled,
dynamically positioned, semi-submersible vessel, possessing a certificate
from Lloyd's Register which showed that she grossed 12,314 tons. She
was originally designed as an offshore drilling unit but in the periods in
question operated as a workover/support vessel carrying out well workover
operations in the Campos Basin off South America, meaning that she
could install, refurbish and perform sub-sea completion work on wells but
could not enter the pressure confines of the well due to the limitations of
her equipment, which meant that she could not be used when the oil was
flowing. The designation "support vessel" indicated that she had functions
4 Keith Wyn Torr and Capt William Mair and James Innes and Captain David Hargrave and John Paul
Buchanan v The Commissioners for HM Revenue and CustOITIS Spc00679
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other than workover, i.e. diving, crane operations, including heavy lifts,
construction and pipe laying.
On top of any oil well under the sea, there is a structure known as an
X-mas tree, extending about 10 metres up from the sea bed. Her work
involved carrying out maintenance work on this X-mas tree. Although
mainly engaged in repairing non-functioning equipment, Pride South
America was not engaged in a regular maintenance programme, being used
rather when problems arose, when the well was 'killed', by which is meant
that the flow was halted temporarily, with all valves being closed when
Pride South America was summoned.
The case pivoted on the interpretation of Regulation 3 of the
Offshore Installation and Pipeline Works (Management and
Administration) Regulations 1995 which, perhaps somewhat
incongruously in the context of this case, had been introduced to
implement health and safety protection on offshore installations in UK
territorial waters. 3 (I) defined the meaning of' offshore installation' as:
a structure which is, or is to be, or has been used, while standing
or stationed in relevant waters, or on the foreshore or other land
intermittently covered with water -
(a) for the exploitation, or exploration with a view to
exploitation, of mineral resources by means of a well;
(b) for the storage of gas in or under the shore or bed of relevant
waters or the recovery of gas so stored;
(c) for the conveyance of things by means of a pipe; or
(d) mainly for the provision of accommodation for persons who
work on or from a structure falling within any of the provisions
of this paragraph,
(e) and which is not an excepted structure.
These Regulations, however, followed the foundation legislation,
defining the key issues of fact, in Section 192 Income and Corporation
Taxes Act 1988 (Foreign emoluments and earnings, pensions and certain
travel facilities). Schedule 27 Finance Act 2004 amended the 1988 Act by
introducing Section 837C, defining the meaning of "offshore installation"
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in somewhat greater detail. Subsection I confines the application of this
provision to the Tax Acts, and delimits the meaning of "offshore
installation" to a structure which stands or is stationed in waters, whether
or not they are offshore; subsection 2 defines uses encompassing
exploration for and exploitation of mineral resources by means of drilling,
and those other matters noted above in the 1995 Regulations. To this
extent, therefore, the legislation is consistent - even to the inclusion of
accommodation units, known as 'floatels', which will be visited below in
reliable authorities.
Subsection 3 excludes a structure which is not used for any other
purpose or has ceased permanently to be used for one of the purposes
stated in subsection 2; we may therefore divine that a vessel which
occasionally, even very frequently at all, is used for one of those purposes,
must be an 'offshore installation'. But is it a Ship? Importantly, this
question is clarified by subsection 4:
(4) In this section "structure" includes a ship or other vessel.
The facts in Torr and Others hinged on the 'use' of the appellants'
vessel. The issue under the 1995 Regulations was whether she was a
structure used while standing or stationed in relevant waters for the
exploitation of mineral resources; but the really interesting bit is that,
during the proceedings it was accepted by the HMRC that, apart from the
exclusion of offshore installations by ICTA 1988, s. I92A(3) and ITEPA
2003, s.385(a), Pride South America was a ship. Effectively, HMRC's
position embraced the point made by subsection 4, that a ship could be an
offshore installation at the same time.
In drawing his Conclusions, the Special Commissioner stated, inter
alia:
In my judgment in the context of regulation 3 "exploitation"
clearly refers to physical rather than economic exploitation,
particularly since the exploitation is "by means of a well". It
does not cover sale of mineral rights for a capital sum or
royalties. It clearly involves extraction of the crude oil from
under the sea bed. Furthermore it involves use of a structure'.
5 Para 43
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The real question is how far the concept of use of a structure for
exploitation of mineral resources by means of a well extends6 •
In my judgment the mineral resources do not cease to be
exploited merely because a well is killed to enable corrective
action to be taken. While I do not accept the submission of Mr
Williams that exploitation encompasses work after the oilfield
has ceased production, I hold that it does cover repair work when
the field is in production notwithstanding the fact that the field
has to be temporarily killed).
I see no logic in the 1995 Regulations, which are directed to
health and safety, applying if the structure is only in use during
normal production when there is no problem but not applying if
the structure is used to remedy a problem. In my judgment the
Pride South America was used for the exploitation of mineral
resources, notwithstanding that the wells were killed or shut
down while it was being used8 •
Dismissing the Appeal, the Special Commissioner added:
While the logic of applying health and safety legislation to
persons employed on offshore structures in British waters or the
Continental Shelf is clear, the logic of denying foreign earnings
deduction to seafarers working on offshore structures in the
South Atlantic is not apparent. However while I have
considerable sympathy with the Appellants, my duty is to
interpret the law as enacted9•
The Consequences
It is, perhaps, fortunate that, in consequence of this decision, HMRC
has announced a review of the relevant definitions, as HMRC's own
published guidance distinguishes between a 'ship' and an 'offshore
installation' in terms which, by simple deduction, make them mutually
exclusive, in the Revenue's eyes, at least.
6 Para 44
7 Para 48
8 Para 49
9 Para 53
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It may be helpful to draw on the assistance of recent legislation in
the form of section 1001(1) Income Tax Act 2007, which defines an
'offshore installation' for the purpose of the Income Tax Acts as:
a structure which is, is to be, or has been, put to a relevant use while
in water.
Subsections 3 and 4 must be applied to this definition, which largely parrot
the provisions of837C of the 2004 Act and, as a result of this consistency,
reconfirm the Will of Parliament which clearly intended to delimit the
application of this law, ring-fencing the structures standing or stationed
with a view to exploring or exploiting sea-bed resources by drilling
operations - however incidental this may be the structure's other uses.
Once again, we have Parliament's clear expression in subsection 5:
In this section "structure" includes a ship or other vessel. to
Unfortunately, this is inconsistent with HMRC's current positIOn: in a
document entitled Seafarers' Earnings Deduction: Oflshore installations
and ships: examples!!, the statement following the title declares beyond
any misunderstanding:
Offshore installations and therefore not ships/2
The following are not accepted as ships for the purposes of the
deduction: Fixed production platforms
Under this heading, the Revenue lists a range of structures which it deems
to fall within 837C, including the obvious, such as floating production
platforms, as well as the more challenging, grouping 'jack-up rigs' with
'drillships' into 'mobile offshore drilling units'.
There then follows a menu of 'Vessels' working in the offshore oil
and gas industry that the Revenue accepts, in its own words, 'as ships'.
The vessels listed are conceded as ships for the purposes of the deduction
'if they satisfy the general conditions described at EIM33101', and
include, inter alia, anchor handling vessels, pipe laying barges, platform
support vessels and well service tankers. Importantly, seismic survey
10 Author's emphasis
11 HM Revenue & Customs, Employment Income Manual EIM33104, London
12 Author's emphasis
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vessels are included; this is interesting for the fact that seismic survey
vessels have precisely the same purpose as ships which explore the sea-
bed by drilling core samples; yet the latter is clearly a 'drillship' and
therefore excluded by the Revenue as a Ship, although Legislation clearly
indicates otherwise.
We therefore have an apparent problem in the inconsistency with
which thc law is applied, which raises the spectre of a failure of
governance, in that the Revenue appears not to be accountable for its
interpretation or otherwise of the Will of Parliament. This is compounded
when we address EIM33101 in the Employment Income Manual, which
addresses thc Meaning of 'Ship' and promptly states l ):
There is no statutory definition of the word ship.
This is a most unfortunate assertion. It is not suggested that the following
list is inclusive but it does offer alarmingly compelling evidence to the
contrary:
The Marine Insurance Act 1906 provides:
Sch I r 15 The term 'ship' includes the hull, materials and outfit,
stores and provisions for the officers and crew, and, in the case
of vessels engaged in a special trade, the ordinary fittings
requisite for the trade, and also, in the case of a steamship, the
machinery, boilers, and coals and engine stores, if owned by the
assured.
2 The Carriage of Goods By Sea Act 1971 Article 1 scheduled follows
the Hague Rules as amended by the Brussels protocol 1968 to define a
ship as:
any vessel used for the carriage of goods by sea
3 Section 24 Supreme Court Act 1981 states:
'ship' includes any description of vessel used in navigation and
(except in the definition of "port" in section 22(2) and in subsection
(2)(c) of this section) includes, subject to section 2(3) of the
Hovercraft Act 1968, a hovercraft
13 HM Revenue & Cusloms, Employment Income Manual EIM33! 0 I, London
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4 The Pilotage Act 1987 follows the meaning of 'Ship' as defined in
the Harbours Act 1964:
57 'ship', where used as a noun, includes every description of vessel
used in navigation, seaplanes on the surface of the water [and
hovercraft within the meaning of the Hovercraft Act 1968]
5 Section 313( I) Merchant Shipping Act 1995 states:
'ship' includes every description of vessel used in navigation
6 A 'vessel', as mentioned in that definition, is defined in Rule 3 (a) of
The Merchant Shipping (Distress Signals and Prevention of Collisions)
Regulations 1996 as:
every description of water craft, including non-displacement craft,
WIG craft l4 and seaplanes, used or capable of being used as a means
of transportation on water.
To say that HMRC's assertion of a lacuna in statutory definitions of a
'Ship' is misconceived, is an understatement.
Encouragingly, the Special Commissioners in Torr and Others gave an
honourable mention to the case of Perks v Clarki" stating that, for the
purposes of the deduction a ship must be:
• capable of navigation and
• used in navigation.
The Special Commissioners undoubtedly found highly persuasive the
opinion ofCarnwarth J who quoted Halsbury's on the meaning ofa Ship:
To be a ship a vessel must be used in navigable waters ...And,
although she must be constructed for navigation, it is not
necessary to the definition that she should be able to navigate
under her own power. The presence of a rudder and the manning
of the vessel with a crew are important as showing that a vessel is
14 a vessel capable of operating completely above the surface of the water on a dynamic air cushion created by
aerodynamic lift
15 Perks v Clark [2001] 2 Lloyd's Rep 431
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a ship, but the absence of either does not mean that a vessel is not
a shipJ(,.
Carnworth.J found that 'Navigation' does not necessarily connote anything
more than 'movement across water'IJ.
Perks v Clark is a highly relevant authority and, conveniently,
enables us to broaden the horizon of this study by examining judicial
authority on the meaning of a 'ship'. Unfortunately, however, the Revenue
misrepresents the case reported. This was a taxation case which required a
judicial ruling on seafarers' emoluments. It involved the definition of a
ship, in the case of seafarers who were employed on jack-up rigs; the issue
being whether jack-up rigs were classified as ships for the purpose of the
Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988.
On appeal from the General Commissioners, Ferris.J held, that the
work of a jack-up drilling rig was to be positioned at a point on the surface
of the earth, there to perform the static function of drilling into the earth's
crust; its ability to float and to be moved from place to place by means of
outside assistance was merely incidental to its static non-floating work;
overall the rigs did not have sufficient characteristics of ships to lead to the
conclusion that each of them was a ship for the purposes of para 3(2A) of
Sch 12 of the 1988 Act; the jack-up rigs were not ships for that purpose.
On Appeal, the Court of Appeal held,
(I) The word 'ship' was as ordinary an English word as one could
Imagme ...
(3) So long as 'navigation' was a significant part of the function of
the statute in question, the mere fact that it was incidental to some
more specialised function such as dredging or the provision of
accommodation did not take it outside the definition .... The function
of conveying persons and cargo from place to place was not an
essential characteristic IK.
This case is supported by a number of previous decisions, which deserve
some summary:
In Marine Crafi Constructors v Blomqvist [1953]19 a pontoon was
used for the purpose of transporting the ring of a crane to a convenient
1611alsbury's Laws of England, 4tb ed, 1973, Vol 43 (Para 91 l, Butterworth & Co (Publisher) Ltd, London
17 Perks v Clark. at r 439
I KPer Carnwath .I at p439
19 Marine Cratl Constructors Ltd v Erland Hlomqvist (Engineers) Ltd r1953] I Lloyd's Rep 514
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place where the ring could be lifted from the pontoon and placed with
other dismantled portions of the crane for the purpose of being transhipped
to Finland. Lynskey, J, expressed the firm view that the pontoon was being
used to be towed for the carriage of goods through the water and to be
navigated for that purpose, stating:
She was carrying this ring and was within what I should think
was a clear definition of a vessel or a boat when one bears in
mind the many other forms of articles in the water which have
been held to be ships and vessels which the ordinary individual
would not be likely to have so described in ordinary language2".
Two ancient cases, The Mac [1882fl, supported by The Mudlark
[1911]22, illustrated the scenario that a hopper barge, used in connection
with dredging purposes, had no means of propulsion, being towed to take
her to and from her destination when carrying dredged materials to sea for
the purpose of discharging them, was held to be a ship.
In Addison v Denholm Ship Management [1997Y\ a 'floatel', that is,
a platform attached by legs or columns to pontoons which enable it to float
on water, and taken to the location of the installation, possibly under its
own power, but usually under tow, was held to be a ship. In the light of
this decision, it is, perhaps, surprising, that in the HMRC's document
ElM33104, it clearly states:
The following are not accepted as ships for the purposes of the
deduction: ... flotels (floating accommodation units).
In the light of this, we may legitimately observe that, given the
unreliability of such significant issues in HMRC's guidance, what areas
can be relied upon? This becomes very relevant when considering the
inconsistency in EIM33104 previously described which, in fact, presents
itself to an expert in this sector as difficult to rationalise. The document
states that certain structures are not accepted as ships for the purposes of
the deduction, including mobile offshore drilling units and drillships, while
then stating that seismic survey vessels may be accepted as ships for the
purposes of the deduction if they satisfy the general conditions.
20 pSI8
21 The Mac [1882] 7 PD 126
22 The Mudlark [1911] PD 116
23 Addison v Denholm Ship Management (UK) Ltd [19971 ] CR 770
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A drillship is a mantlme vessel that has been fitted with drilling
apparatus. The definition includes a vessel used for exploratory drilling of
new oil or gas wells in deep water - as well as a vessel used for drilling as
part of the scientific survey work essential to the project. A seismic survey
ship conducts scientific survey work essential to the project, but does not
require a drilling derrick. As a result, two ships, with identical uses in
scientific survey, apparently suffer from a distinction which suggests that
the position in law can be applied very inconsistently indeed. Consider the
good ship Wimpey Sealab24 •
In 1958, the Bowater Steamship Company Limited of London took
delivery of the Elizabeth Bowater, first in a series of identical sisters,
which became famous as the Bowater Lakers, with their delivery
coinciding with the opening of the St Lawrence Seaway to the Great Lakes
in 1959. They were built to the high specification of Lloyds 100 A I
'strengthened for ice class 3', with sophisticated navigation equipment on
board. They had the deadweight capacity of lifting some 5,458 tons of
cargo, being designed especially to carry woodpulp for the Group's
newsprint mills; but, of course, in order to keep the ships constantly
employed, they would be chartered to carry whatever general cargoes
could be fixed when not needed for carrying forest products. By any
definition, Elizabeth Bowater was a 'ship', and a very fine one too.
The latter half of the 20th century proved to be a troubled time for
UK shipping and, in 1972, Elizabeth Bowater was sold to Wimpcy
(Marine) Limited, who had plans for her as a survey vessel. But she first
had to undergo a conversion which equipped her with a drilling derrick on
her foredeck to take core samples from the sea bed, a moon pool - the
rather alarming feature to the uninitiated, of an opening in the hull bottom
through which the drilling equipment passed on its way to the sea-bed -
and retractable positioning dynamic thrusters under the hull. She had a
new name, as well, Wimpey Sealab but was still very distinctly a Bowater
Laker beneath the changes.
Wimpey Sealab had the benefit of a leap in technology which
provided a 'stay-still' solution, delivering a dynamic positioning system
while she surveyed coal deposits off the north coast of England. She then
traded the North Sea for the comparatively calm climate of the English
Channel - and the tense business of carrying out her survey work amidst
one of the world's busiest sea-lanes, sometimes in fog as supertankers, gas
carriers and busy passenger ferries passed by, when the wash from their
24 See Daniels, S, 2007. Sea Changes, Southampton Solent University, Southampton UK
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movement often made it difficult for the ship's dynamic positIOning
equipment to meet the exacting demands of keeping exactly on-station,
and even a modest movement could buckle or break the long, thin drill that
stretched down to the sea-bed. In order to do her job, under conditions in
which conventional mooring was impossible, she was steered with the help
of an embryonic form of satellite navigation and her position was
maintained by a digital computer into which was fed information such as
wind speed and direction, and her heading controlled directly by computer,
commanding the power of 1,000 horsepower thruster propellers.
In the wider scheme of things, of course, her ship's company of 60
men might have considered the demands on her dynamic positioning needs
to be a mere occupational hazard by comparison with the death-defying
stunt of laying stationary while vessels of every sort passed by, day and
night, in fog or blue skies, while she was engaged in drilling bore holes in
the sea floor and taking core samples which had to be analysed in the
laboratories on board, and the information sent ashore.
Incredibly, according to the HMRC definition, Wimpey Sealab was
not a ship. Indeed, according to s I00 I Income Tax Act 2007 she would
satisfy the definition of an offshore installation in that she was used while
standing or stationed in any waters.
It may be argued that reliance on one example may be unsafe as the
foundation upon which to build a compelling argument. In that case, we
may draw upon the evidence of Captain Francois Hugo, currently Senior
Lecturer at Warsash Maritime Academy, who kindly gave the following
information to the author in an interview in November 2008. Captain
Hugo had held a Master's Foreign-Going Certificate when he served on a
Seismic Survey Ship, registered under a non-UK t1ag, for the use of
diamond prospecting, off South West Africa, in 1995. She had side scan
sonar sweeps to detect probable diamondiferous gravel sites. She also had
the capability for test drilling in order to assess quality.
At this stage, it may be helpful to explain that a seismic survey ship
is steaming while towing a seismic string. Normal watchkeeping is
required for the safe navigation of the ship, in addition to monitoring
position in order to follow the survey line required.
The ship may also be used to drill for core sampling, when she will
be anchored or will maintain station by dynamic positioning. In addition,
the ship might be used for other work, such as mining by air lift and
separation of the resource from bulk material. This is performed while at
anchor, using the anchors to position and move the ship for mining the
area, then moving as a ship to other locations.
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Whatever the use to which she is put, in addition to the normal
seamanship skills an enhanced level of seamanship skills is required in
order to undertake the surveyor mining task.
In the interview, Captain Hugo defined with clarity his
understanding, which had been gained through maritime experience and
common-sense, that an offshore installation, as one permanently attached
to the sea bed without mobile capability. The distinction is that the survey
ship is mobile, while the offshore drilling installation is static. Seamanship
skills are required for a ship which is capable of steaming between
locations; while such skills are not required for a static installation. In a
survey ship, there is a high responsibility for the navigational accuracy of
the passage in order fully to assess the resource under survey. In addition,
seafarers are exposed to risks in deploying and recovering the survey
equipment, requiring additional training and the maintenance of dedicated
safe working practices. None of these risks and responsibilities are shared
with offshore installations; but Captain Hugo pointed out that offshore
installations have their own high risk procedures requiring appropriate
training and safe working practices.
Captain Hugo concluded with the assertion that service on a survey
vessel requires a higher degree of professionalism than on many other
vessels.
This evidence sheds important light on the practical features which
characterise such vessels. By any test of common-sense, they must surely
satisfy any definition of a ship. The taxation legislation, however, would
seek to superimpose upon that definition, that of an offshore installation,
despite the clear distinctions which Captain Hugo draws, both as to use -
whether occasional use or not - and as to the skills required of the seafarers
crewing the vessels. HMRC apparently goes further still in its
construction of the terms in stating that 'a ship is not an offshore
installation'. In fact, HMRC is quite correct, but in a way which differs
radically from that which it had in mind.
Having espoused the obvious, common-sense argument, it is
appropriate to examine the application of a definition by case law, and see
where common-sense has taken the Courts. The case of R v Goodwin25
involved an appeal against conviction by the accused, Mark Goodwin,
who was charged following a collision between the jet ski which he was
riding with another jet ski, whose rider was injured, and indicted on a
single count of Conduct endangering ships, structures or individuals,
25 R v Goodwin [2005] EWCA Crim31X4; [2006J 1 W.L.R. 546
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contrary to Section 58(2)(a) Merchant Shipping Act 1995, which states
that if a person, while on board his ship or in its immediate vicinity, does
any act which causes or is likely to cause the death of or serious injury to
any person, he shall be guilty of an offence.
In delivering Judgment, Lord Phillips CJ said that the relevant
provisions, as the title 'Merchant Shipping' suggested, were primarily
aimed at shipping as a trade or business, not at pleasure craft such as jet
skis:
While it may be possible to extend the meaning of ship to vessels
which are not employed in trade or business or which are smaller
than those which would normally be so employed, if this is taken
too far the reduction can become absurd26 •
This brings the argument to the critical question of the word 'use', which
was the foundation stone of the Court's decision on the interpretation of a
'Ship'. The common sense wisdom of Sheen J was relied upon in
reference to Steadman v Scofield [1992]27:
A vessel is usually a hollow receptacle for carrying goods or
people. In common parlance 'vessel' is a word used to refer to
craft larger than rowing boats and it includes every description of
watercraft used or capable of being used as a means of
transportation on water2B •
Having addressed the authorities, Lord Phillips held,
We have concluded that those authorities which confine 'vessel
used in navigation' to vessels which are used to make ordered
progression over the water from one place to another are
correctly decided. The words 'used in navigation' exclude from
the definition of 'ship or vessel' craft that are simply used for
having fun on the water without the object of going anywhere,
into which category jet skis plainly falJ29.
26 Para 32
27 Steadman v Scotield [1992] 2 L10yds Rep 163
28 P166
29 para 33
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The rationale of the decision has been summed up succinctly by the
Statute Law Review30, which observed that the Court of Appeal wisely
avoided determining whether a jet ski was a ship on the basis of its
construction, but applied the test as to whether it was used to make ordered
progression over the water from one place to another. In fact, the wisdom
of the Court's approach was somewhat obvious, as it was focusing on the
vessel use rather than her construction, which is the clear reasoning
demanded by the statutory definition under Section 313( I).
That being said, the observation of the Statute Law Review is not
quite accurate because the Court did, in fact, consider the determination of
a ship based on its construction: namely in the meaning of 'sea-going':
... with the exception of certain specified sections [of which, in
fact, section 58 is one], Part III applies only to "ships which are
sea-going ships and masters and seamen employed in sea-going
ships"31 ... The suggestion that the Waverunner was a sea-going
ship is worthy of A.P.Herbert. By no stretch of the imagination
could that craft be so described. While jet-skis are used on the
sea in proximity to land, they do not go to sea on voyages nor,
we suspect would they be seaworthy in heavy weatherJ2 •
To summarise the point, having embraced the possibility of
extending the meaning of a 'Ship' to vessels which were not employed in
trade or business, or which were smaller than those which would normally
be so employed, the Court rejected the definition that a 'ship' could be
applied to ajet ski.
Writing in Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly, G
Bowtle made a keen observation on this rationale, that a ship which is used
for pleasure purposes leaving from and returning to the same place where
the owner is regarding as 'messing about in boats' [as in Curtis v Wild33 ]
will apparently be outside the Act, but a similar ship whose owner is a
little more adventurous going to other destinations will be subject to the
requirements of the ActJ4 . This is a pertinent point, which may be taken to
the next logical step that the same boat, one day, may loaf around inshore
waters and, the next, boldly sail for another continent. In this way, the
311 Statute Law Review 27( I ), iii-vi, doi: 111.1 1193islrihmiIl211
31 para 36
32 para 39
33 Curtis v Wild [1991] 4 All ER 172, at 174
34 Bowlle, G, 211117, 'A Vessel used in Navigation"', Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly, Part I,
Informa,l,ondon
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danger becomes apparent in relying on the use of a vessel to divine its
meaning in law.
A common-sense approach to this question which, of course, is that
which Lord Phillips espoused so highly, demands that the definition of a
'Ship' be determined as a question of fact, which conveniently allows us to
draw upon authorities from other jurisdictions. The difficulty with which
this fact is determined in comparative laws, can be observed in the
approaches taken in Canada and in the United States.
In the 2002 Canadian case of Atttorney-General v McNally
Construction'S, the issue arose as to whether the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Agreement on Government
Procurement (AGP) applied to the procurement by a Government
department of a jet-propelled patrol boat for use in the coastal waters of
the Maritime provinces. Essentially, McNally Construction Inc., an
unsuccessful bidder for the building contract, filed a complaint with the
Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT) alleging that contrary to
NAFTA and the AGT the Government department concerned had failed to
make an award in accordance with the criteria specified in the tender
documents.
The appellant contended that the solicitation was covered by specific
exclusions for 'shipbuilding and repair' in NAFTA and the AGP. Having
determined that the word 'ship' has both a broad and narrower meaning,
the CITT adopted the narrower definition of 'Ship' as a 'large sea-going
vessel', in the sense that it is fit to cross the sea and make distant voyages
as opposed to a coasting, harbour or river vessel. It concluded that the boat
in question was not a ship and that the procurement was not in respect of
'shipbuilding' within NAFTA and the AGP.
The Appeal was heard in Ottawa in 2002, when the Appeal Judges
upheld the decision, finding inter alia:
(2) The CITT did not err in taking into account various
definitions of 'shipbuilding' and 'ship' and the purpose for the
tendering provisions of NAFTA and the AGP in construing the
language of the exclusions. The language of the exclusions
suggested that they were not intended to apply to any craft that
might conceivably fall within a broad definition of that language
but only to a large seagoing ship built or repaired on procurement
of the federal government.
35 Canada (Attorney General) v. McNally Construction Inc. (CA.), 2002 fCC 633
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While the narrower definition was that which was embraced by the Court,
that still embraced the criteria for a ship as a 'large sea-going vessel', in
the sense that it is fit to cross the sea and make distant voyages as opposed
to a coasting, harbour or river vessel.
Further examination of comparative laws offers deeper insight into
this study when we consider the case of Stewart v Dutra Construction]!>.
The facts of this case underpin the meaning in American law of a Ship,
which can be found well-defined under the United States Code:
Title 18:
(e) Definitions: In this section -
"ship" means a vessel of any type whatsoever not permanently
attached to the sea-bed, including dynamically supported craft,
submersibles or any other floating craft, but does not include a
warship, a ship owned or operated by a government when being
used as a naval auxiliary or for customs or police purposes, or a
ship which has been withdrawn from navigation or laid up.
Title 47:
(39) Ship
(A) The term "ship" or "vessel" includes every description of
watercraft or other artificial contrivance, except aircraft, used or
capable of being used as a means of transportation on water,
whether or not it is actually afloat.
The 2005 case of Stewart v Dutra Construction Company involved a claim
under the Jones Act, originally adopted as the Merchant Marine Act in
1920, and codified on October 6,2006 as 46 USC Sec. 30104.Section 688
(a) provides:
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his
employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages
at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all
statutes of the United States modifying or extending the
common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to
railway employees shall apply; and in case of the death of any
seaman as a result of any such personal injury the personal
36 Stewart v Dutra Construction Company (03-814) 543 U.S. 481 (2005) 343 F.3d 10
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representative of such seaman may maintain an action for
damages at law with the right of trial by jury, and in such action
all statutes of the United States conferring or regulating the right
of action for death in the case of railway employees shall be
applicable. Jurisdiction in such actions shall be under the court of
the district in which the defendant employer resides or in which
his principal office is located.
Dutra Construction had engaged Willard Stewart, a marine engineer,
to maintain the mechanical systems on a dredger, the Super Scoop,
working in Boston Harbour. The Super Scoop was described as a massive
t10ating platform from which a clamshell bucket was suspended beneath
the water. The bucket removed silt from the ocean t100r and dumped the
sediment onto one of two scows (small barges) that floated alongside the
dredge. The Super Scoop had certain characteristics common to seagoing
vessels, such as a captain and crew, navigational lights, ballast tanks, and a
crew dining area, but had a limited means of self-propulsion, navigating
short distances by manipulating its anchors and cables. Over longer
distances it had to be towed.
At the time of Stewart's accident, the Super Scoop lay idle because
one of its scows had suffered an engine malfunction and the other was at
sea. Stewart was working on board the idle scow, perched beside the
hatch, when the Super Scoop used its bucket to move the scow. In the
process, the scow collided with the Super Scoop, causing a jolt that
plunged Stewart headfirst through the hatch to the deck below. He was
seriously injured and brought proceedings against Dutra under the Jones
Act.
Unfortunately the Jones Act did not define the term 'Vessel', but the
Judges were able to rely on the definition contained in Title 18 (above).
They developed their rationale clearly, explained in masterly terms by
Cornell Law School:
From the very beginning, these courts understood the differences
between dredges and more traditional seagoing vessels. Though
smaller, the dredges at issue in the earliest cases were essentially
the same as the Super Scoop here. For instance, the court could
have been speaking equally of the Super Scoop as of The
Alabama37 when it declared:
37 The Alabama, 19 F. 544, 545 (SD Ala. 1884).
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"The dredge and scows have no means of propulsion of their own
except that the dredge, by use of anchors, windlass, and rope, is
moved for short distances, as required in carrying on the business
of dredging. Both the dredge and the scows are moved from
place to place where they may be employed by being towed, and
some of the tows have been for long distances and upon the high
seas. The dredge and scows are not made for or adapted to the
carriage of freight or passengers, and the evidence does not show
that, in point of fact, this dredge and scows had ever been so used
and employed.w '
In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court
held that a 'vessel' included any watercraft capable of transportation.
Thomas Emery, Proctor in Admiralty, with American law firm Garan
Lucow Miller, may have been expressing a somewhat critical opinion
when he commented39 :
In Dutra, the Supreme Court has expanded the definition of a
vessel to include pretty much anything that floats and is "capable
of transportation". Jet skis, oil tankers, floating slabs of concrete:
if it floats, it's probably a boat.
Nevertheless, Dutra v Stewart conveys an important understanding of the
application of a broad approach to the definition of a 'Ship'. Happily, the
rationale of the decision enjoys a close affinity with that in Perks v Clark.
The consequences of HMRC's approach to the definition of a 'Ship'
lead to the conclusion that those Members of Parliament who have
expressed their concern over the Revenue's position in the case have a
point, even if it is not the one which they necessarily intended. The
authorities which we have examined support a compelling argument for
the definition of a structure, such as the Pride South America, as a 'Ship'.
What has been exposed in this study is the appalling inconsistency
of its application within the English Legal System. It is apparent that the
taxation legislation describes a 'Ship' and an 'Offshore Installation' as
being different things, although they can be the same; and when HMRC
38 http://www.law.comell.edu/supct/htmll03-814.Z0.html
39 Emery. Thomas, Proctor in Admiralty, Garan Lucow Mil1er, PC, 2008, Great Lakes Seaway Review, Boyne
City,Mi
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seeks to reconcile such nonsense; it actually misrepresents maritime law as
well as the tax legislation which it is meant to apply. One downstream
consequence of this has proved to be extremely beneficial, however, for
we are confronted with a clear failure of good governance.
The Clash with Good Governance
Any solution to the issues confronted in this study must be founded
upon the fundamental properties of jurisprudence. The Courts must apply
the definition of a 'Ship' according to the Intention of Parliament, so they
are presented with an exceptional problem when the Intention of
Parliament is impossible to fathom, as in the case in which a 'Ship' is
defined inconsistently. In the event of an irreconcilable conflict, the
question of which shall prevail is not within the gift of the Courts to
answer. This scenario takes us firmly into the realm of Jurisprudence,
which is the foundation stone of good governance. Kelsen expressed the
Pure Theory of Law simply4°:
As a theory it is exclusively concerned with accurate definition
of its subject-matter.
Lord Templeman embraces Kelsen's theory of the legal norm as an
'ought-proposition' directed at the officials to apply a sanction in certain
circumstances - underpinning the concept that law is essentially the idea
of sanctions and officials41 • These laws receive their validity from higher,
more general laws - the Constitution, which imparts validity to the whole
legal order. Without a Constitution, the entire basis of English Statute Law
is dependent upon what the Crown in Parliament enacts. But, as he states:
.. .it would throw into confusion the whole logic of jurisprudence
in a democratic state if a Statute were to be overthrown by
Common Law - in effect; Judges would be usurping the State
legislative function.
In the absence of good governance, the only recourse available to judges is
to apply the theory of a hard case. Dworkin characterises a hard case in a
40 Kelsen, H, 1934, The Pure Theory of Law, Law Quarterly Review, Sweet & Maxwell, London
41 Templeman, Lord (ed), 1997, Jurisprudence, The Philosophy of Law, Old Bailey Press, London
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situation in the law which gives rise to a genuine argument about the truth
of a proposition of law that cannot be resolved by recourse to a set of plain
facts determinative of the issue42 • Templeman embraces Dworkin's theory
that law is identifiable with the clear empirically identifiable facts of legal
practice:
The law is expressed in language and must rely on plain - clear -
meanmgs.
In the problem scenario in which the underpinning meanings are
equivocal or inconsistent, it necessarily follows that jurisprudence meets
very real obstacles. It may be tempting to seek to reconcile the problem in
the case of the taxation implications for drillships by applying the theory
of a hard case, and relying on Lord Phillips's logic in Goodwin by
reference to the ship's use. The unsatisfactory relationship between
definition and application under the legislation which we have seen,
however, demands that we draw the distinction between a vessel's
occasional use as a 'Ship' and, at other times, as an 'Offshore Installation'.
Determination by occasional use raises even greater problems, however.
As commented in Dutra v Stewart, a ship and her crew do not move in and
out of a particular statute depending on whether the ship is at anchor,
docked for loading or unloading, or berthed for minor repairs43 •
Dwelling on the matter of governance a little longer, the decision of
the Court of Appeal in Goodwin has two other downstream consequences
which Lord Phillips may not have anticipated:
1 Mr Bowtle raises a compelling point44 over a difficulty which might
now arise with the registration of a ship under the 1995 Act. Section I
states:
(I) A ship is a British ship if -
(a) the ship is registered in the United Kingdom under Part II; or ....
(d) the ship is a small ship other than a fishing vessel. ..
Of course, if the vessel were to be excluded from the definition of a 'Ship'
according to the reasoning of Lord Phillips, her registration would be
42 Dworkin. R. 1995, A Matter of principle, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA
43 http://www.law.comcll.edu/supct/hlml/03-gI4.Z0.html
44 Bowlle, G, 2007,'A Vessel used in Navigation?', Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly, Part 1,
Inf()rma, London
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invalid and, taking the point further, in circumstances in which she
subsequently sailed onto the high seas or foreign territorial waters, she
would not be subject to the laws of the flag state, for she would not have
been allocated its flag.
Mr Bowtle further points out that one of the reasons why small
pleasure ships are registered, is so that a lender can have the confidence of
some security by way of a mortgage. If she were not registered, there
would not be a process for registering a mortgage. It must be said, that the
certainty that flows from a mortgage is one of the incentives for registering
a ship under the UK flag in the first place.
2 The decision of the Court may have landed the Government,
potentially, in hot water with its international partners. Bruce Grant of
Newcastle Law School makes the interesting observation in his analysis of
Goodwin45 that, while confirming the position under English law that a
personal watercraft was a vessel, the Court held that it was not subject to
the Collision Regulations. As he points out, this conflicts with the
International Convention which forms the basis for Rule 3(a) as stated
above, which defines a ship as every description of water cra/i, including
non-displacement era/i ... used or capable of being used as a means of
transportation on water.
The UK Government therefore appears to be in breach of its obligations to
give effect to the Convention to which it has signed up.
The absurdity of the process of definition by occasional use can be
illustrated best by the UK Government's own Tonnage Tax regime.
Following extensive consultation with the maritime industry, this optional
regime for shipping companies was introduced into the UK tax system as
part of Finance Act 2000. The provisions implementing the regime form
part of the Government's wider policy to bring about a reversal in the
decline of the UK fleet and have been widely welcomed by the shipping
. d 46III ustry .
In order to qualify, a ship must be seagoing47 , at least 100 gross tons,
and used for:
• Carriage of passengers by sea, or
45 Grant, B, 2006, What is a 'ship': R v Goodwin in the Court of Appeal, Web Journal of Current Legal
Issues.WWW.webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/admin/welcome.html
46 HM Revenue & Customs, lnternational- Tonnage Tax, HMRC, London
47 A ship is regarded as 'seagoing' if ccrtiticatcd for navigation at sea by a competent authority of any country
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• Carriage of cargo by sea, or
• Towage, salvage or other marine assistance carried out at sea, or
• Transport by sea in connection with other services of a kind
necessarily provided at sea.
Crucially, however, Offshore Installations are excluded.
It would be difficult enough to reconcile these provIsions to the
concept of good governance. Its application in practice may present
labours that would dismay a hero from the Greek myths. If, for example, a
seagoing ship, grossing over 100 tons, has previously enjoyed the benefits
of the Tonnage Tax regime, in the event that she is now re-defined under
new criteria to be announced by HMRC, what happens to her, her owners
and her seafarers is open to some speculation.
The most frightening aspect of this scenario is that the Government
Department that would be responsible for addressing such a problem,
would be HMRC, the very department at the centre of the storm raised by
Torr and Others.
Whichever argument is examined, the solution must be to restore
good governance with the accurate definition of subject-matter, which is
consistent across the Legal System and, indeed, consistent with findings of
fact encountered in other jurisdictions. This must surely be delivered by
legislation. So, once again, we must applaud the vigour of Messrs
Anderson, Hoyle, Walley, MacNeil and Clark, MPs, but urge that the
Parliamentary function must be taken further, in order to establish
certainty and consistency in the meaning of a 'Ship', by applying the
common-sense approach which would be embraced by experts in their
field, such as Captain Hugo.
All in all, HMRC must surely be identifying with the wise words of
Mark Twain:
A man who carries a cat by the tail learns something he can learn in
no other way.
Grateful thanks are due to Captain Francois Hugo for his valuable
contribution to this paper
Simon Daniels
Southampton Solent University
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